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THE FEDERAL GAMBLING TAX AND THE CONSTITUTION
Professional gambling is a multi-billion dollar business in the United
States.3 This naked fact serves only as an introduction to the enormity of
the social evil of commercialized gambling. The recent revelations of the
Senate Crime Investigating Committee2 forcefully dramatized the urgent
need for corrective action in order to solve this socio-political problem. In
the Revenue Act of 1951, Congress, recognizing the necessity of controlling
organized crime, enacted two new tax laws on gambling.3
The first law imposes a ten per cent excise tax on all wagers on sports events
or other contests placed with a person engaged in the business of accepting
wagers or in a wagering pool or lottery conducted for profit.4 The second
law is a special $50.00 per year occupational stamp tax on a person liable
for the tax on wagers or a person who receives wagers in behalf of any
person so liable.5 Under the law, every person liable for the special tax
must register with the Collector of the district and give certain information
including (1) his name and place of residence, (2) each place of business
where his gambling activity is carried on, and the names and places of
residence of persons engaged in receiving wagers for him or on his behalf,
and (3) the name and place of residence of each person for whom he is
receiving wagers. 6
The required information is made available for public inspection in the
Collector's Office.7 Furthermore
, 
the statute specifically provides that the
payment of the tax shall not exempt any person from criminal penalties
for violations of federal or state laws prohibiting such gambling activities.8
To insure compliance, there is a fine of $1,000 to $5,000 for failure to pay
either the wagering or registration tax.9 In addition there is a fine for
willful violations up to the amount of $10,000 and imprisonment up to
five years. 10
It is fairly apparent that the purpose of these taxes is to discourage
gambling and to facilitate the enforcement of state criminal laws against
gambling." Thus, the act places professional gamblers in a dilemma. If
1. H. R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1951); SEN. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. 113 (1951). See Comment, Federal Regulation of Gambling, 60 YALE L. J., 1396,
(1951).
2. Le., the Kefauver Committee. See generally Hearings before a Special Committee
to Investigate Crime in Interstate Commerce, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. and 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1951-52); Kefauver, CRIME IN AMERICA (1951).
3. Act of October 20, 1951, 26 U. S. C. § 3285 et seq. (Supp. 1952).
4. INT. REV. CODE § 3285.
5. Id. § 3290.
6. Id. § 3291.
7. Id. §§ 3292, 3275.
8. Id. § 3297.
9. Id. § 3294(a).
10. Id. § 3295(c).
11. The Congressional committees defended the tax as a revenue producing measure.
H. R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 54-55 (1951); SEN. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st
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they register and provide the information required by the act, they may
be subject to prosecution as violators of state anti-gambling laws. On the
other hand, if they refuse to register, the sanctions of the wagering statute
become operative. It is not surprising to find, therefore, that the con-
stitutionality of the occupational stamp tax has been immediately contested
in the federal courts.
Although the wagering tax was challenged on several grounds,12 the
primary objection raised is that the legislation constituted an encroachment
by the federal government upon the police powers reserved to the states
by the Tenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In United States v.
Kahriger,'3 defendant was charged with failure to pay the $50.00 occupa-
tional tax and to register with the Collector of his district. The Pennsylvania
District Court, in granting defendant's motion to dismiss, held that, because
the information required by the registration provisions was "peculiarly
applicable to the applicant from the standpoint of law enforcement and
vice control," the wagering tax invaded the "sanctuary of state control,"
and therefore was not a tax but a penalty.14 The Supreme Court is enter-
taining an appeal in the Kahriger case.' 5 In three subsequent federal district
court cases,' 6 however, the validity of the gambling tax has been sustained.
Before discussing these cases, it might be instructive to examine briefly former
Congressional exercises of the taxing power for regulatory purposes.
In the past the objection has been frequently urged in attacking other
taxing statutes that the Congress, under the pretext of its taxing power,
seeks to invade the reserved powers of the states by regulating matters
which the federal government might not otherwise control.1  This is not
to say that the taxing power may not be used for regulatory purposes.
There can be no doubt of the power of the national government to employ
its taxing power for nonrevenue purposes when to do so will assist it in
carrying out one of its delegated powers. An example of such a use of power
Sess. 112-113 (1951). Annual revenue from the tax was estimated at $400,000,000. Ibid.
However, according to the New York Times, collections for the first four months of this fiscal
year totaled less than one per cent of the estimated figure (i.e., $4,000,000). N. Y. Times,
Nov. 25, 1952, p. 22, col. 6.
12. In Combs v. Snyder, 101 F. Supp. 531 (D.C. 1951), the district court, in denying
plaintiff's motion for an injunction to restrain enforcement of the gambling tax, recognized
the constitutional questions involved, but felt it "unnecessary to discuss" them because
"it is within the discretion of a court of equity to deny its aid to one who does not come
into court with clean hands." Id. at 531-532. The Supreme Court affirmed per curiam.
342 U.S. 939 (1951).
United States v. Forrester, 105 F. Supp. 136 (N. D. Ga. 1952) raised the constitutional
question of the privilege against self-incrimination. Taxpayers claimed that the informational
requirements of the federal wagering tax necessitated disclosure of incriminating facts
with the collector, which contravened the Fifth Amendment: "No person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . ." U.S. CONsT. AMEND.
V, § 1. Citing United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931), the district court stated
the settled rule that the constitutional privilege does not accord protection to a person
where the information might be used against him in some form of criminal proceedings
brought by a state or another country. The privilege only protects a person against
prosecution under federal laws.
13. 105 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
14. Id. at 323.
15. 21 U. S. L. WEEK 3087 (U.S., Oct. 14, 1952) ; argued Dec. 16-17, 1952, 21 U. S. L.
WEEK 3178 (U.S., 1952).
16. United States v. Robinson, 107 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Mich. 1952); United States v.
Smith, 106 F. Supp. 9 (S.D. Cal. 1952).; United States v. Nadler, 105 F. Supp. 918 (N.D.
Cal. 1952).
17. Cases are collected and briefly discussed in Notes, 95 L. Ed. 50 (1951) ; 81 L. Ed.
776 (1936). See also Rottschaefer, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 175-181 (1939).
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to tax is Veazie Bank v. Fenno.'5 That case involved a federal tax of ten
per cent on the amount of state bank notes in order to protect the notes
of the newly established national banks from competition. The Supreme
Court upheld the tax on the theory that Congress was 'merely doing in an
indirect manner what it could do directly, under its currency power. Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court later sustained the protective tariff on the ground
that it is a valid regulation of foreign commerce. 19
It should be carefully noted, however, that an entirely different situation
exists where the federal government uses the taxing power for the ulterior
purpose of regulating matters wholly outside the scope of any delegated
federal power. In 1902 Congress levied a prohibitive tax of ten cents
per pound on colored oleomargarine 20 Clearly, the purpose of the tax
was to eliminate oleomargarine as a competitor for the butter market.
However, in upholding the validity of the oleomargarine tax in Mcray v.
United States,2 ' Mr. Justice White developed the so-called doctrine of
"objective constitutionality." Briefly stated, the test is that a taxing
measure is valid if "on its face" it does not disclose other than a revenue
purpose. The judiciary shall not consider it a part of its function to explore
the motives which may have led Congress to enact the tax law. In other
words, the Court confines itself to the express language of the revenue
act, and pretends to be ignorant of what everyone knows about the purposes
of the law. Such a test was an open invitation to Congress to use the taxing
power as a means of exercising a general national police power.2 2
The invitation was readily accepted by the proponents of a federal child
labor act. After the disappointing experience of Hammer v. Dagenhart.2 3
another basis was sought upon which to justify a new federal child labor law.
Naturally enough they turned to the taxing clause with some assurance
after the Mcray decision. In Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Go.,24 however,
the Court in an eight to one decision held unconstitutional a federal tax
of ten per cent of the net profits of certain designated industries employing
children below specified ages. The Court, finding it difflcult to void the
tax under the "objective constitutionality" formula, devised another test-
the so-called "penalty" doctrine. Although Chief Justice Taft did not
indicate exactly what characteristics are necessary to brand an act as
"penal" rather than fiscal, he expressed a willingness to examine and
evaluate other evidences present in the act besides superficial statements
indicating the purposes to raise revenue. Nevertheless, the Court in the
18. 75 U.S. 533 (1869).
19. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). See Reuschlein and Spector,
Taxing and Spending: The Loaded Dice of a Federal Economy, 23 CORNELL L. Q. 1, 5-11
(1937). The first issue of this volume of the Cornell Law Quarterly contains a symposium on
regulatory taxes. It is a useful source of reference.
20. The tax was repealed in 1950, 64 STAT. 20.
21. 195 U.S. 27 (1904). For an incisive analysis of the McCray and other cases in this
area, consult the articles by Professor Cushman. Social and Economic Control Through
Federal Taxation, 18 MINN. L. REv. 759 (1934); The National Police Power under the
Taxing Clause of the Constitution, 4 MINN. L. REV. 247 (1920). Cf. Bergman, The Federal
Power to Tax and to Spend, 31 MINN. L. REV. 328 (1947) ; Grant, Commerce, Production, and
the Fiscal Powers of Congress, 45 YALE L. J. 751 (1936).
22. Cushman, Social and Economic Control Through Federal Taxation, 18 MIm. L.
REv. 759, 776 (1934).
23. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). (First child labor law unconstitutional under the commerce
clause).




Bailey opinion refused to overrule the inconsistent doctrine of "objective
constitutionality" and the Mcray case.
As Professor Cushman has so aptly pointed out,25 the Oleomargarine
Case and the Child Labor Tax Case provided the courts with two available
judicial techniques for dealing with the validity of national police regula-
tions under the taxing power. When a court wants to uphold a taxing
measure, it may utilize the McCray doctrine and refuse to see or know
anything about the tax which does not appear in the language of the act.
On the other hand, if a court wants to invalidate a taxing statute, it may
take judicial notice of the palpable legislative intention to regulate or
destroy rather than raise money, and hold the act unconstitutional on the
ground that it is not a tax but a penalty.
2 6
In the cases subsequent to the Child Labor Tax Case, the Supreme Court
readily employed the convenient alternative theories. Thus, in United
States v. Constantine,27 the Court in declaring void a special federal excise
tax of $1,000 imposed annually on all persons conducting the liquor busi-
ness in violation of state law talked in terms of the Bailey decision, and
found the tax not a true tax but a penalty employed to enforce state law.
But two years later, in Sonzinsky v. United States,2 8 the Court upheld the
National Firearms Act of 1934 which not only imposed an annual license
tax of $200 on dealers in firearms, but also levied a tax of $200 on each
transfer of a machine gun, sawed-off shot gun, and other noxious type
firearms. Speaking for a unanimous court, M1r. Justice Stone declared that
the act contained "no regulations other than the mere registration pro-
visions, which are obviously supportable as in aid of a revenue purpose.
On its face it is only a taxing measure . . ."29 (Italics supplied). In its
most recent decision on this subject, United States v. Sanchez,30 the Supreme
Court again reaffirmed the "on its face" doctrine in upholding a tax on
marihuana which obviously had as its object the discouragement of the
narcotic traffic. 81
It is not at all surprising that in the present wagering tax cases the
25. Cushman, supra note 22, at 782.
26. See Cushman's comments on Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934),
which held a state excise tax on butter substitutes constitutional. Constitutional Law in
1933-34, 29 AM. POL. Scr. Rav. 36, 51 (1935).
27. 296 U.S. 287 (1935). Mr. Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion. For an
elaboration of his views on the relationship between the taxing power and the states'
police power, see Roberts, THE CoURT AND T E CONsTITUIoN (1951). In a dissenting
opinion by Justice Cardozo, in which Justices Brandeis and Stone joined, the argument
is made that the Court cannot assume that the "Congress is . . . punishing for a crime
against another government." Id. at 298. The tax may be justified, according to the
dissenters, one the theory that illegal dealers cannot complain of a higher tax if Congress
felt that "a business carried on illegally and furtively is likely to yield larger profits
than one transacted openly by law-abiding men" or that "the furtive character of the
business would increase the difficulty and expense of the process of tax collection."
Id. at 297.
28. 300 U.S. 506 (1937).
29. Id. at 513.
30. 340 U.S. 42 (1950). See Comment, 36 IOWA L. REv. 699 (1951).
31. Note the following language of Mr. justice Clark: "It is beyond serious question
that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even
definitely deters the activities taxed. Sonzinsky v. United States . . . The principle
applies even though the revenue obtained is obviously negligible, Sonzinsky v. United
States ...or the revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary, Hampton & Co. v. United
States. . . ." (Italics supplied) 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950). The italicized portion of the above
quotation is a questionable statement of the law. As previously pointed out, note 19 supra,
theHampton case was supportable on the constitutional power to regulate foreign commerce.
[Vol. 43640
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lower federal courts utilize both of the techniques developed by the Supreme
Court. In the Kahriger decision,8 2 Judge Welsh bases his arguments on
the penalty doctrine to invalidate the tax. Turning his attention to the
registration and informational provisions of the statute, he poses this
question: "Is the purpose of the Act . . . to create revenue or to con-
stitute a host of informers. ' 33 Relying solely on United States v. Con-
stantine, he finds the gambling tax void as an invasion of the police power
of the states, because "the exaction is in no proper sense a tax but a
penalty imposed in addition to any the state may decree for the violation
of a state law.' 134 But as demonstrated by the three subsequent cases
supporting the wagering tax,35 the analogy to the Constantine situation is
a weak one. Constantine involved a federal tax of $1,000 on liquor dealers
operating contrary to state laws. There was a regular federal excise of
$25.00 on all liquor dealers; only those illegally dealing in intoxicants
were subject to the $1,000 tax. Consequently, the tax was limited to those
persons who were state law violators. In the gambling tax, however, there
is no such discrimination. Commission of a crime is not a condition precedent
to the payment of the tax. It applies irrespective of the legality of the
gambling activity under state law.
The trio of decisions sustaining the wagering tax rely heavily on the
Mcray-Sonzinsky-Sanchez rationale. The district courts stress the fact
that it is not their duty to search out the motives which impelled Congress
to enact such a law. The language is familiar; the "on its face" doctrine
is reiterated.36 In the Nadler case,3 7 the court notes that the registration
and informational provisions of the statute are similar to those found in
many other tax laws. On previous occasions the Supreme Court has de-
clared that where the regulations have some reasonable relationship to the
exercise of the taxing power, they are valid. 8 It may be argued that the
information required here is necessary for the efficient collection of the
taxes. It is well-known that professional gamblers operate in a surreptitious
fashion. Therefore, the Government maintains that it is necessary to obtain
names and the location of the gamblers' whereabouts in order to facilitate
the collection of the ten per cent wagering tax. 9  However, even if this
32. United States v. Kahriger, 105 F. Supp. 322, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
33. Ibid.
34. See note 27 supra.
35. Two of the cases distinguish the Constantine decision on the basis of the above
analysis. United States v. Robinson, 107 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Mich. 1952) ; United States
v. Nadler, 105 F. Supp. 91"8, 919 (N.D. Cal. 1952). However, Judge Yankwich considers
the Constantine case overruled. United States v. Smith, 106 F. Supp. 9, 12 (S.D. Cal.
1952).
36. E.g., note Judge Holtzoff's statement: "The Courts may not delve into the minds
of the members of Congress. The judiciary is without power to scrutinize the motives
and the purposes of the legislative branch of the government. If an Act of Congress pro-
fesses on its face to levy a valid tax, it is immaterial that the Congress may have, in fact,
sought to attain a different or additional objective." United States v. Robinson, 107 F.
Supp. 38, 39-40 (E.D. Mich. 1952).
37. United States v. Nadler, 105 F. Supp. 918, 919 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
38. E.g., in United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919), the Supreme Court upheld
the elaborate regulatory provisions of the Harrison Narcotics Act on the theory that they
were designed to facilitate the enforcement of the tax. But there can be little doubt that the
dominant purpose of the tax was to regulate an exclusively state matter. Cushman, supra
note 22, at 771-773. For subsequent judicial history of the tax, see Linder v. United States,
268 U.S. 5 (1925); United States v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360 (1926); Nigro v. United
States, 276 U. S. 322 (1928).
39. Brief for Appellant, pp. 13-26, United States v. Kahriger, 105 F. Supp. 322 (E.D.
Pa. 1952).
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